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NOTE
Keep It Real: A Call For a Broader
Quality Control Requirement in
Trademark Law
Noah D. Genel*
INTRODUCTION
Jim rolls out of bed, stumbles into the bathroom, applies shaving cream to his face, and picks up his new ShaveCorp brand
Smooth-Glide razor—the one that is advertised for its ability to
make shaving the smoothest part of your morning. But the first razor stroke across Jim’s face produces a sharp stinging sensation
and draws blood. With the blood streaming down his cheek, Jim
thinks this shave is just too close for comfort!
ShaveCorp responds to Jim’s subsequent complaint by referring him to the Canadian licensee that manufactures the blades under ShaveCorp’s Smooth-Glide trademark. But ShaveCorp cannot
shrug off responsibility so easily; the company risks the loss of
trademark protection for failing to adequately police the quality of
its licensed Smooth-Glide razor blades.1 Ironically, ShaveCorp

* J.D. Candidate, 1998, Fordham University School of Law. The author gratefully
acknowledges the insight, support, and friendship of Professor Hugh C. Hansen, Fordham University School of Law, in the preparation of this Note. This Note is lovingly
dedicated to my parents, Jeffrey and Regina, who inspire me to reach for my goals.
1. See BEVERLY PATTISHALL, ET AL., TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 4.05
(2d ed. 1994) [hereinafter PATTISHALL, TRADEMARKS] (“In the absence of real and effective control by the licensor the trademark will no longer symbolize a particular source [of
goods] and the licensor may no longer have a protectable interest in the trademark.”); see
also Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart’s Food Stores, Inc. 267 F.2d 358, 366 (2d Cir. 1959)
(“[T]he Lanham Act places an affirmative duty upon a licensor of a registered trademark
to detect and prevent misleading uses of his mark by his licensees or suffer cancellation
of his federal registration) (citing Trademark Act of 1946 (“Lanham Act”), ch. 540, 60 Stat.
427 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1051-1127 (West 1997))); see, e.g., C.B. Fleet
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would not have risked the same type of trademark damage had it
manufactured and sold dull razor blades on its own.2 There lies the
strange dichotomy in the doctrine of trademark quality control.
The quality control requirement is a well-established doctrine
of trademark assignment and licensing.3 The quality control rule
stems from the notion that brands are more than mere indicators of
source, as they were originally viewed.4 Modern courts and commentators recognize that trademarks identify both the source and
the quality of the products or services to which they are affixed.5
Co. v. Complete Packaging Corp., 739 F.Supp. 393, 395-96 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (illustrating
a comprehensive set of quality control procedures established by the licensor of a trademark); see also infra Parts I.D.1, I.D.2 (setting forth the rules against assignment in gross
and naked licensing of trademarks).
2. See PATTISHALL, TRADEMARKS, supra note 1, § 4.05, at 164-69 (explaining that
the quality control requirement eases the deceptive consequences of trademark licensing). Because trademark licensing, in effect, misleads the public as to the source of
goods, the quality control requirement insures that such de facto deception does not work
a harmful effect on the public. See id.; see also Helene Curtis v. National Wholesale
Liquidators, Inc., 890 F. Supp. 152, 157 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (noting that goods must meet
the trademark owner’s quality control standards to be considered genuine goods, otherwise “their sale will constitute trademark infringement”) (quoting Polymer Tech. Corp. v.
Mimran, 37 F.3d 74, 78 (2d Cir 1994)); see also, e.g., C.B. Fleet Co. 739 F.Supp. at 39899 (enjoining further use of a licensed trademark following product contamination because consumers would buy the licensed products in the erroneous belief that they had
been manufactured under the control of the trademark owner); cf. Burger King Corp. v.
Stephens, T.L.C.S., Inc., No. CIV-A 89-7691, 1989 WL 147557 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 6, 1989)
(recognizing the risk of physical harm to consumers in a case involving subversion of
quality standards in a fast-food franchise).
3. See Warner-Lambert Co. v. Northside Dev. Corp., 86 F.3d 3, 6 (2d Cir. 1996)
(discussing how fluctuation of the quality of a product can result in tarnishment of the
trademark under which the product is marketed); Shell Oil Co. v. Commercial Petroleum,
Inc., 928 F.2d 104, 107 (4th Cir. 1991) (affirming District Court’s finding that quality
control standards are an “integral part” of a trademark); El Greco Leather Prods. Co. v.
Shoe World, Inc., 806 F.2d 392, 395-96 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding that goods marketed under a trademark but not produced under the trademark holder’s quality controls were not
“genuine” goods for purposes of trademark law).
4. See Ethan Horwitz & Benjamin Levi, Fifty Years of the Lanham Act: A Retrospective of Section 43(a), 7 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 59, 60-61 & nn.4,
5 (1996) (noting trademark’s origins in the common-law tort of deceit and the law of unfair competition); Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40
HARV. L. REV. 813, 813-19 (1927) (discussing the evolution of the modern trademark).
5. See Schechter, supra note 4; see also Polymer Tech., 37 F.3d at 78 (explaining
that “trademark law . . . serves to guarantee the quality of the trademarked product”)
(quoting Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Granada Elecs., Inc., 816 F.2d 68, 75
(2d Cir. 1987) (Cardamone, J., concurring)).
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Accordingly, trademark law imposes a requirement on trademark
licensors and assignors to control the quality of the products produced under their brand names by licensees and assignees.6 This
rule guarantees that licensed products are genuine7 and that they
maintain their integrity.8
Ensuring that only genuine products reach the market perpetuates goodwill.9 Without a quality control requirement, a trademark
license might divorce the mark from its goodwill because the
products produced by the unsupervised licensee would likely fall
below the brand owner’s quality controls.10 Thus, consumers who
purchase non-genuine goods, relying on the mark’s goodwill,
would be deceived.11
Today, courts apply the quality control requirement not to all

6. See TMT North Am., Inc. v. Magic Touch GmbH, 124 F.3d 876, 885 (7th Cir.
1997) (stating that “[i]f a trademark owner allows licensees to depart from its quality
standards, the public will be misled, and the trademark will cease to have utility as an
informational device”); Taco Cabana Int’l, Inc. v. Two Pesos, Inc., 932 F.2d 1113 (5th
Cir. 1991) (explaining that “[t]he purpose of the quality control requirement is to prevent
the public deception that would ensue from variant quality standards under the same
mark or dress”), cert. granted in part, 502 U.S. 1071, aff’d, 505 U.S. 1071 (1992).
7. Genuine goods are products made and distributed under the trademark owner’s
quality controls. See Polymer Tech., 37 F.3d at 78 (stating that “[g]oods . . . that do not
meet the trademark owner’s quality control standards will not be considered genuine
goods, and their sale will constitute trademark infringement”).
8. See 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 18:55
(4th ed. 1996) (stating that “customers are entitled to assume that the nature and quality
of goods and services sold under the mark at all licensed outlets will be consistent and
predictable”).
9. Goodwill is defined as “[p]roperty of an intangible nature, commonly defined as
the expectation of continued patronage.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 694 (6th ed. 1990);
see also 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 8, § 2:17 (stating that goodwill “is a business value
that reflects the basic human propensity to continue doing business with a seller who has
offered goods and services that the customer likes and has found adequate to fulfill his
needs”).
Although this Note spells the term “goodwill” as one word, several of the authorities
quoted herein use the term as two words: “good will.”
10. See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 8, § 18:2 (explaining that “[g]oodwill and its
trademark symbol are as inseparable as Siamese Twins who cannot be separated without
death to both”).
11. See id. § 18:3 (stating that “[u]se of a mark . . . in connection with a different
goodwill and different product may result in a fraud on the purchasing public, who reasonably assume that the mark signifies the same nature and quality of goods or services”).
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trademark owners, but only to those who either assign or license
their marks.12 Nevertheless, courts are slowly broadening the doctrine in the recognition that consumers use brands to tell them exactly what products they are about to purchase, rather than to indicate merely the source and quality of those goods.13
Although the law is expanding in this area, the quality control
requirement remains an under-used doctrine.14 Its critics argue
that it serves no important purpose and should be discarded.15 Its
proponents, however, argue that the requirement protects the essence of the trademark itself.16 The scope of the quality control
requirement thus remains an open issue.17
This Note asserts that the quality control requirement should
apply to all trademark owners, regardless of whether or not they
assign or license their marks. Part I recounts the history of the
quality control requirement. Part II discusses the differing views
regarding the utility of the doctrine and analyzes cases in which
courts have and have not enforced the requirement. Part III argues
that the quality control requirement would effectively preserve
public trust in the trademark system if it were expanded to apply to
all trademark owners. This Note concludes that courts should apply the quality control doctrine equally to every trademark holder.

12. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (discussing how courts currently apply
the quality control requirement).
13. See Warner-Lambert Co. v. Northside Dev. Corp., 86 F.3d 3, 6-8 (2d Cir. 1996)
(applying the quality control requirement to wholesalers of trademarked goods); Shell
Oil Co. v. Commercial Petroleum, Inc., 928 F.2d 104, 107-08 (4th Cir. 1991) (same); see
also infra Parts II.A.1, II.A.2 (analyzing Warner-Lambert and Shell Oil).
14. See infra Part II (discussing the conflict over the proper application of the quality control requirement).
15. See Kevin Parks, “Naked” Is Not a Four Letter Word: Debunking the Myth of
the “Quality Control Requirement” in Trademark Licensing, 82 TRADEMARK REP. 531,
568-69 (1992).
16. See Elmer William Hanak, III, The Quality Assurance Function of Trademarks,
43 FORDHAM L. REV. 363, 363-64 (1974) (stating that “one can make the argument that
in the world of modern marketing the primary function of a trademark is to indicate degree of quality”).
17. See infra Part II (setting forth the debate over the proper application of the quality control requirement).
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I. HISTORY OF THE QUALITY CONTROL REQUIREMENT
The Trademark Act of 1946 (“Lanham Act”)18 defines a
trademark as “any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof [used or intended to be used by a person] in commerce . . . to identify and distinguish his or her goods . . . from
those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of
the goods, even if that source is unknown.”19 This definition is
consonant with the traditional view of trademarks as indicators of
source.20
The definition has sparked great debate in its application as
trademark theorists argue over whether brands serve merely as
source indicators or whether they also represent a level of product
quality that a consumer can expect to receive upon purchasing an
item.21 This part examines the history and purposes of the quality
control requirement in trademark law and explains how a trademark owner’s neglect of quality control can cause an abandonment
of the mark.
A. The Trademark as an Indicator of Source
Courts and commentators always have viewed trademarks as
indicators of source.22 The modern trademark is rooted in the
“regulatory production mark,” which manufacturers were required
by law to affix to their products in order to allow consumers to
trace defective craftsmanship back to its source.23
The ancestor of the modern trademark protected consumers by
enabling them to police the marketplace and by giving them a
18. Trademark Act of 1946 (“Lanham Act”), ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427 (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1051-1127 (West 1997)).
19. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1127 (West 1997).
20. See infra note 22 and accompanying text (explaining the traditional view of the
function of trademarks).
21. Compare Parks, supra note 15, at 531-36 (arguing that trademarks do not
“guarantee” the quality of the goods to which they are affixed), with Hanak, supra note
16, at 363 (stating that “[t]oday virtually every writer on trademark law accepts the quality assurance function”).
22. See Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 412 (1916) (finding that
a mark’s purpose is “to identify the origin or ownership of the goods to which it is affixed”).
23. Schechter, supra note 4, at 814.
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means of seeking redress if they purchased a sub-quality product.24
Source identifiers not only allow purchasers to quickly identify
goods, they also insure that manufacturers are accountable to consumers for any substandard products.25 The desire for manufacturer accountability led to the emergence of the quality-indicator
function of trademarks.26
B. The Trademark as an Indicator of Quality
Almost all trademark theorists define trademarks as indicators
of a product’s source and as guarantors of its quality.27 In this
manner, brands enable owners to create goodwill.28 Goodwill provides consumers with the ability to easily relocate and repurchase a
certain product based on its brand name.29 Requiring brand owners to maintain consistent product quality strengthens goodwill and
builds consumer trust in the entire trademark system.30 Consequently, the quality control requirement allows consumers to rely
on trademarks as indicators of exactly what they are about to purchase, instead of merely who produced it.31

24. See id.
25. See id.
26. See id. at 819 (stating that “today the trademark is not merely the symbol of
goodwill, but often the most effective agent for the creation of goodwill imprinting upon
the public mind an anonymous and impersonal guarantee of satisfaction”). The mark can
only guarantee satisfaction with a product if it accurately conveys the nature of the product to the consumer; the quality of the item is an integral aspect of the product. See Hanak, supra note 16, at 364 (stating that consumers rarely know or care about the exact
source of the products they buy).
27. See id. at 363 (asserting that “virtually every writer on trademark law accepts
the quality assurance function”); see also Schechter, supra note 4, at 818 (stating that
“[t]he true functions of the trademark are . . . to identify a product as satisfactory and
thereby to stimulate further purchases by the consuming public”). Professor Schechter’s
theory shows that trademarks are symbols of goodwill. See discussion supra note 9 (defining “goodwill”). But see Parks, supra note 15, at 532 (arguing that trademarks do not
serve to guarantee the quality of a product).
28. See Schechter, supra note 4, at 818 (“To describe a trademark merely as a symbol of goodwill, without recognizing in it an agency for the actual creation and perpetuation of goodwill, ignores the most potent aspect of the nature of a trademark and that
phase most in need of protection.”).
29. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (defining “goodwill”).
30. See Schechter, supra note 4, at 819 (stating that trademarks are the “most effective agent[s] for the creation of goodwill”).
31. See Hanak, supra note 16, at 364. According to Hanak, consumers are con-
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C. Neglect of Quality Control Is Abandonment
Section 45 of the Lanham Act states that a trademark will be
deemed to be abandoned if the owner (1) discontinues using the
mark with the intent never to resume using it, (2) causes its mark
to become the generic name for the item to which the mark is affixed, or (3) causes its mark to lose its significance as a trademark.32 In interpreting this definition, courts have ruled that
trademark assignors and licensors abandon their marks when they
fail to establish and monitor quality controls to which their assignees or licensees must adhere.33
Failure to supervise the manufacturing process of a product
causes its quality to fluctuate, thus consumers cannot rely on its
trademark to indicate exactly what they are buying.34 As a result,
the brand loses its significance in the marketplace, and the mark
holder violates the third principle of the definition of abandonment
in the Lanham Act.35
1. The Rule Against Assignment in Gross
The owner of a trademark may assign the right to use the mark
to a third party.36 The law requires, however, that any assignment
also include the goodwill in the mark.37 Trademarks enable sellers

cerned about their ability to use trademarks as a personal measure of quality. Id. (“In
short, a consumer wishes to match a trademark with what he likes and dislikes. If the
origin of a product is of concern to a consumer, it is only because the manufacturer’s
products have come to be associated with a certain level of quality.”).
32. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1127 (West 1997).
33. See infra Parts I.C.1, I.C.2 (setting forth the rules against assignment in gross
and naked licensing).
34. See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 8, § 18:55 (describing the requirement for consistent quality in trademarked goods).
35. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1127.
36. See Clark & Freeman Corp. v. Heartland Co., 811 F. Supp. 137, 139 (S.D.N.Y.
1993) (“Generally, an assignment of a trademark and its accompanying goodwill will
entitle the assignee to step into the shoes of the assignor.”) (internal quotations omitted).
37. Id. (quoting Marshak v. Green, 746 F.2d 927, 929 (2d Cir. 1984)). According
to the Marshak court, the “[u]se of the mark by the assignee in connection with a different goodwill and different product would result in a fraud on the purchasing public who
reasonably assume that the mark signifies the same thing, whether used by one person or
another.” Marshak, 746 F.2d at 929.
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to market their goods by affixing names to them.38 Consumers
sample a product and, if they like it, they can quickly find it again
through recognition of the trademark.39 As consumers repeatedly
purchase the item, its mark gains goodwill and, in the language of
trademarks, grows in strength.40 Thus, strong marks reduce consumer search costs by immediately identifying what products buyers will receive when they rely on the goodwill in those brands.41
When a trademark owner separates its mark from the goodwill in
that mark, for example by assigning the right to use the brand
name without establishing provisions for the simultaneous transfer
of the mark’s goodwill, search costs rise because the brand no
longer necessarily represents the true nature of the items sold under that name.42
Section 10 of the Lanham Act states that “[a] registered mark
or a mark for which application to register has been filed shall be
assignable with the goodwill of the business in which the mark is
used.”43 The reason behind this limitation, according to Professor
McCarthy, is that “a trademark is merely a symbol of goodwill.”44

38. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 8, § 3:2. Professor McCarthy explains that
trademarks perform four basic functions:
1. To identify one seller’s goods and distinguish them from goods sold by others;
2. To signify that all goods bearing the trademark come from or are controlled
by a single, albeit anonymous, source;
3. To signify that all goods bearing the trademark are of an equal level of quality; and
4. As a prime instrument in advertising and selling the goods.
Id.
39. See id. (“Without the identification function performed by trademarks, buyers
would have no way of returning to buy products that they have used and liked.”).
40. See id. (“If this consumer satisfaction and preference is labeled ‘goodwill,’ then
a trademark is the symbol by which the world can identify that goodwill.”).
41. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic
Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 268-70 (1987) (arguing that trademarks perform an
“economizing function” by making goods easily identifiable using unique names attached to each item). Professor Landes and Judge Posner write that “[t]he value of a
trademark is the saving in [consumer] search costs made possible by the information or
reputation that the trademark conveys or embodies about the brand.” Id. at 270.
42. See id.
43. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1060 (West 1997).
44. 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 8, § 18:2.
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If the mark loses that goodwill, it is worthless.45 After an assignment in gross, “the assignee obtains the symbol, but not the reality.”46 Trademark law, therefore, forbids a brand owner from assigning its mark to another party without simultaneously
conveying its goodwill.47 Such an assignment would deceive consumers who rely on the brand’s goodwill because the purchased
items would differ from what they expected to receive, due to the
original brand owner’s lack of input in the manufacturing process.48
Consistency of product quality effectively promotes repeat purchasing and strengthens goodwill49—even where products are of a
lesser, rather than higher caliber.50 Consumers become repeat buyers after enjoying a favorable experience with a product, and they
expect the product’s quality to remain consistent.51 In this manner,
repeat purchasing indicates consumer satisfaction with the quality
of the product.52 The rule against assignment in gross protects
consumers by requiring a trademark assignor to monitor its
assignee, insuring that the products the assignee produces retain
their pre-assignment quality level.53 The consumer can thus be
45. See DuPont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Prods. Co., 85 F.2d 75, 82 (2d Cir. 1936)
(holding that the word “cellophane” has become generic to most people, hence signifies
only the product, not the source or quality of that product).
46. 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 8, § 18:3.
47. See discussion supra note 37 (describing the connection between trademarks
and goodwill).
48. See Marshak v. Green, 746 F.2d 927, 929 (2d Cir. 1984).
49. See Landes & Posner, supra note 41, at 270. Professor Landes and Judge Posner assert that “[o]nce the reputation [of a brand] is created, the [owner of the mark] will
obtain greater profits because repeat purchases and word-of-mouth references will generate higher sales and because consumers will be willing to pay higher prices for lower
search costs and greater assurance of consistent quality.” Id.
50. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 8, § 3:10 (explaining that “the quality function of
marks does not mean that marks always signify ‘high’ quality goods or services -–
merely that the quality level, whatever it is, will remain consistent and predictable among
all goods or services supplied under the mark”).
51. See id.
52. See Landes & Posner, supra note 41, at 270 (“Creating . . . a reputation requires
expenditures on product quality.”).
53. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 8, § 3:11 (stating that “it is clear that trademark
law permits the licensing of a mark under any circumstances where the licensor exercises
quality control over goods and services that reach the customer under the licensed
mark”).
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confident that what he buys will meet his expectations.54
Professor McCarthy explains that “[t]he situation sought to be
avoided [by outlawing assignments in gross] is customer deception
resulting from abrupt and radical changes in the nature and quality
of the goods or services after assignment of the mark.”55 Assignment in gross is a fraud on the public.56 The only way to avoid this
consumer deception is to force the assignor to transfer the goodwill
in the trademark to its assignee, including the level of product
quality.57
2. The Rule Against Naked Licensing
Section 5 of the Lanham Act, entitled “Use by Related Companies,” authorizes trademark owners to license their marks to other
companies in the same field of business.58 The provision contains
three restrictions, (1) that the licensee be a “related company,” (2)
that the mark not be used in a manner that will deceive the public,
and (3) that the owner monitor its licensee with respect to the “nature and quality” of the goods or services that the licensee produces.59 This rule, permitting the licensing of trademarks, reflects
a change from the law’s original treatment of trademarks.60
As the law first developed, courts viewed trademarks as representing only the actual physical source of the product to which
they were affixed.61 This outlook is now known as the “source
54. See id. § 3:10 (indicating that trademarks send a message to consumers that they
can expect to receive goods of consistent quality).
55. Id. § 18:10.
56. See id. § 18:3 (“Use of the mark by the assignee in connection with a different
goodwill and different product may result in a fraud on the purchasing public.”).
57. See id.
58. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1055 (West 1997); see also Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart’s Food
Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 367 (2d Cir. 1959) (finding that the “Lanham Act clearly carries forward the view . . . that controlled licensing does not work an abandonment of the
licensor’s registration, while a system of naked licensing does”).
59. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1055.
60. See Dawn Donut, 267 F.2d at 366 (recounting that “[p]rior to the passage of the
Lanham Act, many courts took the position that the licensing of a trademark separately
from the business in connection with which it had been used worked an abandonment,”
regardless of whether or not the license contained provisions by which the licensor could
control the quality of the licensee’s product).
61. See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 8, § 18:39.
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theory” because it treats trademarks as nothing more than indicators of source.62 In the 1930s, however, theorists developed the
“quality theory” of trademarks,63 in which brands serve the dual
role of indicating both the source and quality of products and services.64 Professor McCarthy states that “the consumer assumes
that products sold under the same trademark will be of equal quality regardless of the actual physical source or producer of the
goods.”65
Professor McCarthy highlights the fact that the source theory
does not adequately account for the way consumers use trademarks.66 The average shopper wants to know what product he is
purchasing, not the exact identity of the manufacturer.67 Section 5
of the Lanham Act68 recognizes this reality by authorizing a trademark owner to license its mark subject to the condition that the licensor maintain control of both the nature and quality of the products marketed under that trademark.69
Because a brand’s goodwill sends a message to the consumer
that he will have the same experience with the product today as he
had in the past,70 the brand’s message is false if its owner does not
retain control over the quality of the products sold under the mark.
Such goods are not genuine.71 The effects of a trademark owner’s

62. See supra Part I.A (discussing how trademarks act as indicators of source).
63. See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 8, § 18:40.
64. See supra Part I.B (discussing the quality indicator function of trademarks).
65. 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 8, § 18:40.
66. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 8, § 3:10 (indicating that trademarks simultaneously indicate both the source and quality of a product or service).
67. See id. § 3:9 (stating that the “source function was gradually softened by the
courts to mean that the consumer expected all goods with the same mark to come from a
single, but anonymous or indistinguishable, source”).
68. 15 U.S.C.A. 1055 (West 1997).
69. See id. §§ 1055, 1127.
70. See supra notes 9, 28-30 and accompanying text (defining goodwill and discussing its utility); see also 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 8, § 3:10 (asserting that trademarks
indicate consistency in quality).
71. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 8, § 18:42 (stating that a product is “genuine”
only if it has been “manufactured and distributed under controls established by the manufacturer”); see also Shell Oil Co. v. Commercial Petroleum, Inc., 928 F.2d 104 (4th Cir.
1991) (“[I]n order to maintain the genuineness of the bulk oil, the quality control standards must be controlled by [the brand’s owner].”); El Greco Leather Prods. Co. v. Shoe
World, Inc., 806 F.2d 392, 395-96 (2d Cir. 1987) (ruling that the shoes manufactured by
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lack of control over the quality of the goods sold under his brand
name, therefore, are potentially devastating to the entire system of
trademarks.72
3. The Introduction of the Quality Control Requirement to
Trademark Law
In Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart’s Food Stores, Inc.,73 the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals became the first court to apply the quality
control requirement. In Dawn Donut, the court held that the Lanham Act permits a trademark owner to license its mark as long as
that owner retains control over the quality of the goods its licensee
sends into the market.74 If the owner fails to exercise such control,
it will be deemed to have abandoned its mark.75
The theory behind the rule in Dawn Donut is that naked licensing “create[s] the danger that products bearing the same trademark
might be of diverse qualities.”76 Consumers are deceived when
they purchase a product believing it to be of one quality, and it
turns out to be different.77 Although the market eventually may
punish naked licensors through decreased sales of their products,
consumers will be misled repeatedly during the period of market
adjustment.78 Congress, therefore, sought to prevent consumer deception entirely by promulgating the Lanham Act.79 Courts use
the defendant were not genuine because the trademark owner was not given an opportunity to inspect them prior to distribution). “The mere act of ordering a product to be labeled with a trademark does not deprive its holder of the right to control the product and
the trademark.” Id. at 395-96.
72. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 8, § 3:10 (asserting that “few harms are more corrosive in the marketplace than the inability of a trademark holder to control the quality of
bogus articles thought (erroneously) to derive from it”) (quoting Hypertherm, Inc. v. Precision Prods., Inc., 832 F.2d 697, 700 (1st Cir. 1987)).
73. 267 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1959).
74. See id. at 367.
75. See id.
76. Id. (citing American Broadcasting Co. v. Wahl Co., 121 F.2d 412, 413 (2d Cir.
1941); Everett O. Fisk & Co. v. First Teachers’ Agency, Inc., 3 F.2d 7, 9 (8th Cir.
1924)).
77. See id. (“If the licensor is not compelled to take some reasonable steps to prevent misuses of his trademark in the hands of others, the public will be deprived of its
most effective protection against misleading uses of a trademark.”).
78. See id.
79. See S. REP. NO. 79-1333, at 1-2 (1946) (stating that the Lanham Act “has as its
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that legislation to strip naked licensors of all protection for their
marks.80 They rule that any licensed trademark that does not perform its function as a quality indicator has been abandoned by its
owner, the licensor.81
II. THE DEBATE OVER THE PROPER APPLICATION OF THE QUALITY
CONTROL REQUIREMENT
The proper application of the quality control requirement is an
issue that has sparked great debate.82 Kevin Parks, a critic of the
quality control requirement, argues that the quality assurance theory of trademark law is useless.83 He hypothesizes that “[n]ever
would so significant a ‘change’ in the law of trademarks come so
quietly into being as when the quality theory of trademarks was
recognized for what it is—an anachronism.”84 This view is in
stark contrast to that of proponents of the quality control requirement, who believe that quality assurance is the primary purpose of
trademarks.85 Although trademark theorists have made strong arguments on both sides of this issue, neither Congress nor the courts
have definitively resolved the question of how broad the quality
control requirement should be or whether it should exist at all.
This part sets forth the conflict over the correct application of
the quality control requirement—analyzing the manner in which
the debate is fueled by the divergent approaches of courts, some of
objective the protection of trademarks, securing to the owner the goodwill of his business
and protecting the public against spurious and falsely marketed goods”).
80. See Stanfield v. Osborne Indus., Inc., 52 F.3d 867, 871 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding that naked licensing is “inherently deceptive and constitutes abandonment of any
rights to the trademark by the licensor”); Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp. v. Diversified
Packaging Corp., 549 F.2d 368, 387 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding that a trademark owner
loses the right to use the mark when he allows the mark to lose its utility as an informational device for consumers through uncontrolled licensing).
81. See SIEGRUN D. KANE, TRADEMARK LAW: A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE 153, 156
(2d ed. 1991) (arguing that abandonment is an “affirmative defense” which will preclude
a plaintiff’s recovery).
82. See generally Parks, supra note 15, at 531-68 (challenging the validity of the
quality control requirement).
83. Id. at 569.
84. Id.
85. See Hanak, supra note 16, at 363-64 (contending that “one can readily make the
argument that in the world of modern marketing the primary function of a trademark is to
indicate degree of quality, and only secondarily to indicate origin or source”).
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which expand the reach of the quality control requirement while
others refuse to enforce the doctrine. The varying approaches represent a serious conflict in trademark law.
A. Many Courts Now Recognize A Broader Rule
The quality control requirement undeniably applies to cases of
assignment in gross and naked licensing.86 In addition, courts are
now slowly expanding its application to other factual situations.87
Most significantly, federal courts have held within the last ten
years that wholesalers of a trademarked product must comply with
the trademark owner’s quality controls.88 When wholesalers violate this rule, courts protect brand owners who sought to protect
themselves by attempting to monitor the quality of the goods marketed under their brands.89 Shell Oil Co. v. Commercial Petroleum, Inc.90 and Warner-Lambert Co. v. Northside Development
Corp.91 are two recent cases that illustrate this new trend.
1. The Shell Oil Case
Shell Oil Co. (“Shell”), a major producer of oil used in trucks,
routinely licensed its trademarks “Rotella” and “Shell Rotella T”
to distributors and imposed stringent quality control procedures on
those licensees.92 Commercial Petroleum, Inc. (“Commercial”),
the defendant, is an oil wholesaler who sold “Shell Rotella T” oil
regularly, employing independent quality control methods.93
Commercial’s controls were lax in comparison to Shell’s rigorous

86. See supra Parts I.A, I.B (setting forth the source and quality control rationales
of trademark).
87. See infra Parts II.A.1, II.A.2 (demonstrating how courts are expanding the reach
of the quality control requirement).
88. See generally Warner-Lambert Co. v. Northside Dev. Corp., 86 F.3d 3 (2d Cir.
1996) (holding that the manufacturer was entitled to a preliminary injunction forbidding
the sale of its product after expiration of the freshness date); Shell Oil Co. v. Commercial
Petroleum, Inc., 928 F.2d 104 (4th Cir. 1991) (affirming a preliminary injunction against
a wholesaler’s unauthorized trademark use).
89. See Warner-Lambert, 86 F.3d at 7; Shell Oil, 928 F.2d at 107.
90. 928 F.2d 104 (4th Cir. 1991).
91. 86 F.3d 3 (2d Cir. 1996).
92. See Shell Oil, 928 F.2d at 106.
93. See id.
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requirements.94 In addition, Commercial did not have Shell’s permission to disregard Shell’s high standards.95 Shell, therefore,
brought an action in federal court, based on trademark infringement and unfair competition law, claiming that Commercial’s actions caused a likelihood of confusion among consumers of “Shell
Rotella T” oil.96
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit began its analysis
by stating that trademark law does not “apply to the sale of genuine goods bearing a true mark, even if the sale is without the mark
owner’s consent.”97 The court found, however, that trademark law
did apply in this case because Commercial was selling nongenuine oil under Shell’s brand name.98 Moreover, Shell’s quality
control requirements were a part of the product.99 According to
the court, in order to be considered a genuine product, the oil had
to pass through Shell’s stringent quality controls.100
Having found that Commercial was marketing a non-genuine
product, the court proceeded to address Shell’s claims of trademark infringement and unfair competition.101 It ruled that “[t]he
use of the Shell marks implies that the product has been delivered
according to all quality control guidelines enforced by the manufacturer.”102 Commercial’s use of the Shell brand on a nongenuine item could lead prospective buyers to believe that they
were purchasing a genuine product, and those consumers might believe that the oil had passed through Shell’s rigorous quality control standards when, in fact, it had not.103 The court found that
Commercial had violated Shell’s right to control the quality of the
goods manufactured and sold under its mark.104

94. See id.
95. See id.
96. See id. at 106-07.
97. Id. at 107.
98. See id. (“Without Shell’s enforcement of its quality controls, the bulk oil sold
by Commercial was not truly ‘genuine.’”).
99. See id.
100. See id.
101. See id. at 107-08.
102. Id. at 108.
103. See id. at 107.
104. See id. at 108.
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Shell Oil reaffirmed the holding of El Greco Leather Products
Co. v. Shoe World, Inc.,105 in which the court ruled that quality
control standards are actually a part of the product.106 In Shell Oil,
the Fourth Circuit recognized that consumers rely on trademarks as
quality guarantors.107 No matter who is ultimately responsible for
putting the product into stores, if the good has not passed through
the brand owner’s quality controls, that product is not genuine.108
Selling it as if it were genuine is deceitful to consumers.109 Courts
use the quality control requirement to protect consumers against
this form of deceit.110
2. The Warner-Lambert Case
In Warner-Lambert, the Second Circuit adopted a rationale
similar to that used in Shell Oil. Warner-Lambert Co. (“WarnerLambert”) sued Quality King, a wholesaler of health and beauty
aids, to enjoin the sale of Warner-Lambert cough drops sold under
the brand name “HALLS.”111 Warner-Lambert employed strict
quality control measures to insure that consumers of “HALLS”
would not ingest stale cough drops.112 According to WarnerLambert, its cough drops became stale thirty months after they
were produced, and consumers generally consumed a package of
cough drops within six months after purchase.113 Warner-Lambert,
therefore, sought to insure that its cough drops would be sold to
consumers within twenty-four months of production.114
The Second Circuit identified six ways in which WarnerLambert attempted to control the quality of its product, including
105. 806 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1986).
106. See Shell Oil, 928 F.2d at 107 (citing El Greco Leather Prods. Co. v. Shoe
World, Inc., 806 F.2d 392, 395 (2d Cir. 1986)).
107. See id. at 108 (holding that consumers rely on Shell marks as symbols of Shell
quality).
108. See El Greco, 806 F.2d at 395-96 (holding that a product is not genuine unless
it has been through the original manufacturer’s quality controls).
109. See Shell Oil, 928 F.2d at 108 (holding that the defendant’s use of Shell’s
mark without adhering to Shell’s quality control standards was deceptive).
110. See id. (stating that consumers rely on trademarks as symbols of quality).
111. Id. at 5.
112. See id.
113. See id.
114. See id.
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shipping the cough drops within eighteen months of production
and packaging in cases bearing labels stating the expiration
dates.115 Quality King, however, had subverted Warner-Lambert’s
attempts at controlling its own product by removing the packages
of “HALLS” from their original cases and selling them after the
twenty-four month limit had expired.116 Warner-Lambert sued
Quality King to enjoin that practice.117
Quality King, nevertheless, argued that Warner-Lambert failed
to employ adequate quality control procedures.118 The court found
that Quality King’s contention could not be sustained because
Warner-Lambert had the right to make a legitimate business judgment as to the amount of quality control required.119 In addition,
the court noted that a trademark holder will receive an amount of
protection for its mark in proportion to the amount of effort it expends to protect itself.120 The court held that Warner-Lambert had
demonstrated sufficient effort in protecting itself and that Quality
King’s actions had devalued Warner-Lambert’s mark.121 Accordingly, the court protected Warner-Lambert’s mark by enjoining
“HALLS” distribution by Quality King.122
B. Courts Protect Owners Who Protect Themselves
Shell Oil and Warner-Lambert demonstrate that courts are beginning to protect trademark owners against wholesalers who subvert or ignore the owners’ quality control standards, as long as
those owners show a substantial interest in protecting both themselves and consumers from the effects of naked licensing and as115. See id.
116. See id.
117. See id. at 5-6.
118. See id. at 6.
119. Id. at 7 (holding that “[a] trademark holder is entitled, without losing its right
to protect what value the mark has, to make a business judgment that additional quality
control measures would add less value to the mark than their cost”).
120. See id. (holding that the effectiveness of an owner’s controls is relevant to a
court’s decision whether to grant protection against a company’s selling non-genuine
goods under the owner’s mark). “A company that avails itself of wholly effective procedures will generally be entitled to relief against any measurable sales of non-conforming
goods.” Id.
121. See id. at 7-8.
122. See id. at 8.
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signments in gross.123 Conversely, Polymer Technology Corp. v.
Mimran124 reflects the lack of protection accorded to owners who
fail to evince a requisite amount of concern for the quality of their
own products and for the public’s right to rely on the information
conveyed by trademarks.125
Polymer Technology Corp. (“Polymer”) manufactured contact
lens cleaning solution, which it sold under the trademark
“BOSTON.”126 Polymer employed two different types of packaging, one for retail markets, the other for exclusive distribution to
eye-care professionals.127 Polymer never sold the professional
packages to retail stores because those packages did not include a
list of ingredients, expiration dates, and other information of which
the general consuming public should be aware.128 Nevertheless,
Polymer’s contracts with the eye-care professionals did not expressly prohibit the resale of non-retail packaged “BOSTON” solution to retail stores.129
Although defendant Mimran owned a number of stores that
sold eye-care products, Mimram was not an eye-care professional
or an authorized dealer of Polymer’s professional packages.130
Nevertheless, Mimran obtained Polymer’s professional packages
and resold them to retail stores.131 When Polymer sought to enjoin
Mimran’s actions, the Second Circuit found that Mimran had not
violated Polymer’s quality control standards.132
To prevail on its claim, Polymer would have been required to
actually have and follow a definite set of quality control requirements.133 Thus, the Polymer Technology decision demonstrates
123. See discussion supra Parts II.A.1, II.A.2 (analyzing Shell Oil and WarnerLambert).
124. 37 F.3d 74 (2d Cir. 1994).
125. See id.
126. See id. at 77.
127. See id.
128. See id. Polymer sold the professional packages only through authorized dealers. See id.
129. See id.
130. See id.
131. See id.
132. See id. at 78.
133. See id. at 79 (“Because Polymer essentially admits that it did not carefully police any procedures it may have had in place to ensure that the necessary information ap-
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that courts will not protect owners who do not exhibit adequate interest in shielding themselves from loss of goodwill. More importantly, Polymer Technology shows that courts will refuse to rule in
favor of owners who disregard the safety of consumers by adopting procedures that result in inadequate labeling.134
C. Some Courts Do Not Strenuously Enforce the Quality
Control Requirement
The holdings in Shell Oil, Warner-Lambert, and Polymer
Technology demonstrate a trend toward a stronger, broader quality
control requirement in trademark law.135 Some courts, however,
do not enforce the rule, and, in fact, find ways to circumvent it.136
One commentator in particular maintains that the quality control
requirement is useless for this reason, hence should be eliminated
as a doctrine in trademark law.137
One commentator in particular, Kevin Parks, challenges the
utility of both the quality control requirement and the more general
quality assurance theory of trademark law.138 Parks argues that its
elimination “would not require wholesale changes in existing law,”
partly because courts rarely enforce it.139 Although no court has
actually denounced the quality control requirement, some courts
have reduced its effectiveness by imposing a heavy burden of
proof on parties seeking to show that a trademark owner has not
met the requirement.140

peared on Polymer’s packaging, we do not find Mimran’s retail distribution of the professional kits . . . a violation of Polymer’s own quality control standards.”).
134. See id.
135. See supra Parts II.A.1-2, II.B (analyzing the Shell Oil, Warner-Lambert, and
Polymer Tech. decisions).
136. See Moore Bus. Forms, Inc. v. Ryu, 960 F.2d 486 (5th Cir. 1992).
137. See infra text accompanying notes 138-139 (outlining Parks’ arguments).
138. See Parks, supra note 15, at 535.
139. See id. at 568.
140. See id. at 541 (arguing that courts place a “nearly insurmountable” burden on
parties seeking to show abandonment through lack of adequate quality controls); see also
Embedded Moments, Inc. v. International Silver Co., 648 F. Supp. 187 (E.D.N.Y. 1986)
(finding that a trademark license agreement need not include an explicit provision for
quality control as long as the licensor retains actual control, and holding the licensor to a
minimal standard of proof in showing such control).
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A typical example is Moore Business Forms, Inc. v. Ryu,141 in
which Moore Business Forms (“Moore”) registered the name
“Compurite” as a trademark for its business.142 Approximately ten
years later, Ryu began to use the name “CompuRite” in the Houston market.143 When Moore sued for trademark infringement, Ryu
argued in defense that Moore had abandoned its mark by licensing
“Compurite” to another company without providing for quality
controls.144 But the Fifth Circuit held that Moore had not issued a
naked license.145 The court found that “[b]ecause a finding of insufficient control essentially signals involuntary trademark abandonment and works a forfeiture . . . the proponent of a naked license theory ‘faces a stringent standard’ of proof.”146
Consequently, the court held that “there need not be formal quality
control where ‘the particular circumstances of the licensing arrangement [indicate] that the public will not be deceived.’”147
Moore Business Forms and similar cases dilute the strength of
the quality control requirement, making the analysis appear purely
ad hoc.148 For this reason, Parks and other critics call into question
the efficacy of the entire doctrine.149 With the existence of such
disparate holdings as Shell Oil and Moore Business Forms, courts
must re-define the quality control requirement to ensure consistency and predictability within the law.150 The main question is
whether the policy behind the Lanham Act supports either the expansion or the elimination of the entire doctrine.151
141. 960 F.2d 486, 489 (5th Cir. 1992) (applying a “stringent standard of proof” on
the party seeking a judicial finding of abandonment (citing Taco Cabana Int’l, Inc. v.
Two Pesos, Inc. 932 F.2d 1113, 1121 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. granted in part, 502 U.S.
1071, aff’d, 505 U.S. 1071 (1992))).
142. See id. at 488.
143. See id.
144. See id. at 489.
145. See id.
146. Id. (quoting Taco Cabana, 932 F.2d at 1121).
147. Id. (quoting Taco Cabana, 932 F.2d at 1121).
148. See Parks, supra note 15, at 540 (stating that the quality control requirement is
elusive and maintaining that an “objective standard of quality control is futile”).
149. See id.
150. See supra notes 88-110, 141-147 and accompanying text (setting forth the
holdings in Shell Oil and Moore).
151. See infra note 222 and accompanying text (setting forth the purpose of the
Lanham Act).
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III. THE QUALITY CONTROL REQUIREMENT SHOULD APPLY TO ALL
TRADEMARK OWNERS
In enforcing the quality control requirement, there is no sound
reason for courts to distinguish between trademark owners who assign or license their marks and those who do not. Consumers will
suffer equivalent injuries whenever they buy goods that fluctuate
in quality, regardless of whether they purchase them directly from
the trademark owner or from the owner’s licensee. Accordingly,
this part argues that the quality control requirement should be applied to all trademark holders because quality control is essential
to trademark law and serves the same basic principles as the trademark system as a whole.
A. The “Dual Role” Is Actually A Single Function
The traditional view of trademarks as indicators of both product source and quality misconstrues the true value of the trademark
system and fails to recognize how consumers utilize brands.152 A
brand name really carries only one message: The buyer will receive exactly what he has been led expect by way of advertisements, past experiences, and word of mouth.153 That message is
known as the brand’s goodwill.154
Trademarks undoubtedly act as indicators of source.155 Although modern consumers do not have personal relationships with
the manufacturers of the goods they buy, they rely on trademarks
as general indicators of what entities made certain items.156 Once
consumers discover a product that they like, they become repeat
buyers, using the trademark information as an assurance that they
will receive exactly the same item each time they purchase the

152. See Hanak, supra note 16, at 363 (asserting that trademarks serve the dual purpose of identifying both the source and quality of the goods to which they are affixed).
153. See id. at 363-64.
154. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (defining the term “goodwill”).
155. See Schechter, supra note 4, at 813-14.
156. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1127 (West 1997) (defining the term “trademark” as “any
word, name, symbol, or device” that identifies or distinguishes the goods to which it is
affixed from those goods sold by others and to “indicate the source of the goods, even if
that source is unknown”).
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goods marketed under the familiar brand name.157 Manufacturers
achieve consistency in the quality of their products through uniformity in the production process, and the monitoring of the that
manufacturing system is known as quality control.158 Thus, the
quality control requirement must apply to all trademark owners to
avoid fluctuation in product quality because absent such a broad
doctrine. the source information that trademarks provide will not
guarantee consumers that they will receive genuine products.
Courts and most trademark theorists agree that, in addition to
acting as source indicators, trademarks also signify the quality of a
product.159 The specific quality level of an item is immaterial, as
long as it remains consistent.160 Consumers do not always want
the highest quality products; they merely seek consistency and
predictability.161 For this reason, unfair competition law contains
provisions protecting against false representations.162 Trademarks
employed in advertising may not misrepresent the products which
they identify.163 Fluctuation in product quality is analogous to
misrepresentation because the mark will tell consumers that they
will receive one thing when, in reality, they are likely to receive
something of a lesser quality.
Consumers do not think in terms of trademarks acting as “indicator of source” and “indicator of quality,” they only want to know
157. See Hanak, supra note 16, at 364 (explaining that consumers do not care about
the exact source of the products they buy). Hanak writes that “a consumer wishes to
match a trademark with what he likes and dislikes. If the origin of a product is of concern to a consumer, it is only because the manufacturer’s products have come to be associated with a certain level of quality.” Id.
158. See By-Rite Distrib., Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 577 F. Supp. 530, 536 (D. Utah
1983) (“The quality control standards adopted . . . are designed to maintain the consistent
quality of bottled soft drinks and are therefore essential in protecting the goodwill and
trademarks”).
159. See Hanak, supra note 16, at 363 (stating that “[t]oday virtually every writer
on trademark law accepts the quality assurance function”).
160. See El Greco Leather Prods. Co. v. Shoe World, Inc., 806 F.2d 392, 395 (2d
Cir. 1986) (indicating that the “actual quality of the goods is irrelevant; it is the control
of quality that a trademark holder is entitled to maintain”).
161. See supra note 50 (quoting Professor McCarthy).
162. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(a)(1)(B) (West 1997) (prohibiting use of language in
commercial advertising that misrepresents the goods or services in connection with the
purposes for which the goods or services are used).
163. See id.
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what they are buying.164 A mark with little or no goodwill is useless to consumers.165 A strong brand, by contrast, immediately indicates both the source and the quality of the product.166 This information reduces consumer search costs, which is why strong
marks deserve heightened protection. It is also why a mark that no
longer serves its purpose should be deemed to be abandoned under
the terms of the Lanham Act. Courts ought to find that the owners
have abandoned their marks in those cases, regardless of whether
or not any licensing agreements or assignments exist.
B. The Quality Control Requirement Is Consistent with the
Purposes of Trademark Law
Trademark law is generally designed to serve three basic purposes.167 The driving force behind every court’s decision regarding trademarks is an implicit desire to serve at least one of three
policies: (1) the protection of goodwill, (2) the avoidance of consumer confusion, and (3) the preservation and/or creation of interbrand competition.168 Courts can support each of these trademark
policies and bolster the entire system of unfair competition law by
perpetuating a stronger quality control requirement that applies to
all trademark owners.
1. The Protection of Goodwill
Professor Hansen’s first policy of trademark law is the protection of goodwill.169 Courts and the Lanham Act treat the use of a
164. See Hanak, supra note 16, at 364 (asserting that consumers rarely know or
care about the exact source of the products they buy); see also supra Parts I.B, I.C (discussing the terms “indicator of source” and “indicator of quality”).
165. See supra note 10 (stating that a trademark cannot be separated from its goodwill without destroying the utility of the trademark).
166. See supra note 41 and accompanying text (explaining how trademarks perform
an “economizing function” by reducing consumer search costs).
167. See interview with Hugh C. Hansen, Professor, Fordham University School of
Law, in New York, N.Y. (Apr. 3, 1998) [hereinafter Hansen interview] (on file with the
Fordham Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal).
168. See id.
169. See id.; accord 135 CONG. REC. H1207, H1215 (daily ed., April 13, 1989)
[hereinafter Kastenmeier statement] (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier) (“For businesses,
trademarks are a kind of badge of honor, and it is important that their investments in
those marks be protected.”).
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trademark as creating property and concomitant rights.170 Such a
perspective is similar to John Locke’s labor theory,171 which states
essentially that whatever a person creates with his own labor is
rightfully his.172 Courts, in the same way, provide greater protection to trademark owners who expend substantial effort in advertising and other forms of consumer education, to generate goodwill
for their brands.173
Goodwill, nevertheless, is not static property which, once developed, remains perpetually; trademark owners must actively
maintain their brands’ goodwill or risk losing protection for their
marks.174 Thus, the owner must maintain the quality of the product
which the brand represents.175

170. See Kastenmeier statement, supra note 169.
171. See JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 18-19 (C.B. MacPherson ed., Hackett Publishing 1980) (1690).
172. See id. at 19. According to Locke:
Though the earth, and all inferior creatures, be common to all men, yet every
man has a property in his own person: this no body has any right to but himself. The labour of his body, and the work of his hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever then he removes out of the state that nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his labour with, and joined to it something
that is his own, and thereby makes it his property. It being by him removed
from the common state nature hath placed it in, it hath by this labour something annexed to it, that excludes the common right of other men: for this labour being the unquestionable property of the labourer, no man but he can have
a right to what that is once joined to, at least where there is enough, and as
good, left in common for others.
Id.
173. See Vitarroz Corp. v. Borden, Inc., 644 F.2d 960 (2d Cir. 1981) (affirming the
district court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s suit for trademark infringement where Vitarroz
was the senior user of BRAVO’S and Borden began to sell similar products under the
name BRAVOS). In reaching its decision, the court focused on the fact that Borden had
spent “in excess of $1.3 million in developing goodwill for its BRAVOS chips,” while
the senior user’s “expenses in introducing [BRAVO’S] were approximately $13,000.”
Id. at 962; see also Quality Inns Int’l, Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 695 F. Supp. 198 (D.
Md. 1988) (holding that Quality Inns deliberately attempted to benefit by the goodwill
and reputation of McDonald’s, whose family of marks rank among the strongest). In its
analysis, the court found that “McDonald’s spends almost a billion dollars each year on
marketing and advertising.” Id. at 212.
174. See supra Part I.C (defining abandonment in trademark law).
175. See supra note 28 and accompanying text (explaining that maintenance of
product quality promotes goodwill for the brand that represents the particular item and
for the trademark system as a whole).
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If a consumer repeatedly buys a product based on past favorable experiences with it and receives merchandise of the expected
character and quality each time, the goodwill of the mark increases.176 In addition, the consumer is likely to continue this purchasing pattern.177 When a brand’s owner allows the quality of its
product to fluctuate, however, that owner loses the goodwill in the
mark.178 Consumers will wind up buying non-genuine goods.179
Moreover, consumers’ needs will likely go unsatisfied because the
quality of the non-genuine items is not of the expected level.180
Selling non-genuine goods in a manner that makes them appear
to be genuine is deceptive and drains the goodwill from a mark.181
Should the fluctuation in quality persist to the extent that consumers cannot rely on the brand to represent what they will receive
upon purchase, courts must find that the trademark has been abandoned under the Lanham Act.182 This rule would force all trademark owners to police the quality of their products or risk losing
protection for the property they worked to create.183
Although critics may assert that the market will correct the
176. See supra text accompanying note 40 (describing how a trademark grows in
strength).
177. See supra text accompanying note 39 (explaining how trademarks effect the
purchasing patterns of consumers).
178. See Warner-Lambert Co. v. Northside Dev. Corp., 86 F.3d 3, 8 (2d Cir. 1996)
(“Bad experiences by concentrations of consumers can lead to communications that mutually reinforce negative impressions about a mark and cause substantial numbers of consumers and chains to cease purchasing products using the mark.”).
179. See supra note 71 and accompanying text (discussing genuine and nongenuine goods).
180. See Warner-Lambert, 86 F.2d at 6 (indicating that the distribution of a sub-par
product under a trademark may tarnish the image of that mark); cf. JANE C. GINSBURG ET
AL., TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW 760-61 (2d ed., Michie 1996) (noting
that tarnishment is the reduction in a trademark’s “goodwill through its association with
unsavory unrelated goods or services”).
181. See Warner-Lambert, 86 F.3d at 6 (holding that the distribution of nongenuine goods constitutes trademark infringement).
182. See supra text accompanying notes 73-75 (examining the holding in Dawn
Donut that a trademark owner’s failure to control the quality of the products marketed
under its brand by a licensee will result in a court finding that the trademark holder has
abandoned its mark).
183. See supra note 80 and accompanying text (illustrating how courts already use
the Lanham Act as a means of punishing naked licensors, who, by definition, do not police the quality of their products).

GENEL.TYP

294

9/29/2006 4:47 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. 8:269

problems that arise from a manufacturer’s indifference to quality
control, that contention ignores the fact that the market, at best,
will be slow to respond to this occurrence.184 There is a significant
lag time between the point at which the quality of the owner’s
goods begins to fluctuate and the point at which enough consumers
would cease purchasing the goods.185 During that time lag, consumers are deceived again and again, while the careless trademark
owner continues to profit at their expense.186
2. The Avoidance of Consumer Confusion
From an economic perspective, the greatest benefit of trademarks is their ability to reduce consumer search costs.187 Trademarks allow the consumer to simply ask for the desired product by
name, rather than having to describe it in an effort to set it apart
from similar products made by other companies.188 Brand names
allow the consumer to instantly identify the item he is searching
for, instead of hoping that, through the inefficient process of trial
and error, he will stumble upon the item he wants.189 Consumers
employing the trial and error method risk obtaining unsatisfactory
products made by competitors.190
A trademark effectively reduces consumer search costs only if
it accurately represents the item the consumer expects to receive
when purchasing the good based on its name.191 Thus, a brand
name will be ineffective in reducing consumer search costs if, because of lack of quality control, it inaccurately represents the item
184. See supra text accompanying note 78 (stating that consumers will be deceived
repeatedly before the market can adjust to the harm caused by the non-genuine products
sent into the market by naked licensors and their licensees).
185. See supra text accompanying note 78 (maintaining that consumers will be
harmed during the period of market adjustment).
186. See supra note 77 (discussing the effect of naked licensing on the public and
the need to prevent misuses of trademarks).
187. See Landes & Posner, supra note 41, at 268-70 (stating that brand names serve
an economizing role, allowing the consumer to quickly identify the desired product and
allowing the seller to convey information through the brand name).
188. See id. (citing John F. Coverdale, Trademarks and Generic Words: An EffectOn-Competition Test, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 868 (1984)).
189. See id.
190. See id.
191. See id.
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that the consumer is buying.192 The trademark system relies on
consumer trust; consumers must be able to depend on a name as
the indicator of what product they will receive.193 Once the public
can no longer trust brands to indicate product quality, trademarks
become useless.194
3. The Preservation of Interbrand Competition
Critics of the quality control requirement may contend that the
doctrine interferes with interbrand competition by setting a product
quality standard that small manufacturers will be unable to satisfy.195 As a result, courts that insist on the maintenance of consistent quality will exclude smaller companies from competing in the
market.196 This argument, however, misconceives what the quality
control requirement actually is and, therefore, does not make an effective case against the preservation and broadening of the rule.197
The quality control requirement does not purport to impose a
minimum standard on a product’s quality; its only function is to
assure consumers that today’s experience with the trademarked
product today will be comparable to their past experience with the
product, or to the reports they heard about that product from fellow
consumers.198 As long as purchasers can rely on the brand in this
fashion, the trademark system is serving its purpose.199 Quality
control promotes that purpose by enhancing consumers’ ability to
192. See supra note 42 and accompanying text (explaining that consumer search
costs rise when a brand name does not accurately represent the true nature of the items
sold under that name).
193. See supra note 30 and accompanying text (stating that the quality control requirement builds consumer trust in the entire trademark system).
194. See supra note 41 (quoting Professor Landes and Judge Posner, who stated
that the true value of trademarks is in their ability to reduce consumer search costs,
which is not possible if consumers do not have faith in the system.).
195. See generally Parks, supra note 15, at 531-68 (setting forth various arguments
in favor of the abolition of the quality control requirement).
196. See id.
197. See id.
198. See Landes & Posner, supra note 41, at 269 (“[A] trademark conveys information that allows the consumer to say . . . ‘I need not investigate the attributes of the brand
I am about to purchase because the trademark is a shorthand way of telling me that the
attributes are the same as that of the brand I enjoyed earlier.’”).
199. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text (declaring the general purposes
that trademarks serve).
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accurately predict what product they will receive in return for their
money.200
C. Courts Must Require All Trademark Owners To Maintain
Consistent Product Quality
Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart’s Food Stores, Inc.201 and other such
cases address issues of quality control only where a trademark has
been licensed or assigned, rather than in all trademark cases.202
Although trademark owners who do not license or assign their
marks should be subject to the same standards of quality control as
those who do,203 courts have drawn an arbitrary bright line on this
issue.204 Under this bright-line test, the legal analysis turns on
whether or not a trademark owner has licensed or assigned its mark
to a third party, rather than whether that owner has sought to maintain consistency in the quality of its products.205
A leading commentator asserts that the arbitrary nature of the
distinction between trademark licensors and non-licensors “exposes a basic flaw in the control requirement that has never been
adequately addressed.”206 That assertion is an understatement: The
unreasonable disparity is more than a “basic” flaw in the quality
control requirement; it is the central flaw. If the goal of quality
control is to protect consumers from being deceived when they
purchase a product, the focus of the quality control doctrine should

200. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text (stating that the quality control
requirement insures that products put into the market by licensees have been manufactured according to the licensor’s guidelines and that the quality of those items is, therefore, predictable).
201. 267 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1959). See discussion supra Part I.C.3 (describing the
Dawn Donut decision).
202. See Dawn Donut, 267 F.2d at 367 (“Clearly the only effective way to protect
the public where a trademark is used by licensees is to place on the licensor the affirmative duty of policing in a reasonable manner the activities of his licensees.”).
203. See Parks, supra note 15, at 536 (stating that “the fundamental problem with
the quality control requirement is that it forces inconsistent treatment of licensing and
non-licensing trademark owners”).
204. See id.
205. See supra text accompanying note 3 (identifying the quality control requirement as a doctrine specific to the law of trademark assignment and licensing, not a rule
of trademark law in general).
206. See Parks, supra note 15, at 536.
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be on the final product that a company places in the market—not
on whether the factory that made the product belonged to the actual trademark owner or a licensee.207 The licensed or nonlicensed status of a trademarked product is immaterial because the
end result is the same: consumer deception, increased search costs,
and the public’s loss of faith in the trademark system.208
One proposed solution to the arbitrary license/non-license distinction is to eliminate the entire quality control requirement and
allow the market to guide a trademark owner’s decisions concerning maintenance of product quality.209 That proposal ignores the
probability that the market will be slow to correct itself.210 During
that time lag, consumers would continue to purchase products,
consistently receive non-genuine goods, and, subsequently, lose
faith in the system.211
Fortunately, courts are unlikely to abruptly discard an entire
legal doctrine in the way that Parks suggests.212 The problem of
disparate treatment in the area of quality control could be resolved
in a much less drastic manner by simply broadening the requirement to apply uniformly to all trademark owners.213 The proper
focus is on consumer protection; courts cannot allow trademark
owners to market non-genuine goods under their brands and, at the
same time, provide protection for those trademark owners against
infringement from competitors.214 Consumer deception is unac207. See id.
208. See id.
209. See Parks, supra note 15, at 537-38 (“[T]here is no legitimate reason for imposing additional quality control obligations on licensors, or for exposing a licensed
mark to the risk of ‘abandonment’ if the quality levels of licensed goods are inconsistent
or consistently poor.”).
210. See supra text accompanying note 78 (stating that consumers will be deceived
repeatedly during the time it takes for the market to correct itself).
211. See supra note 30 and accompanying text (explaining that quality control
builds consumer trust in the system and that a lack of quality control will reduce that collective faith.).
212. See generally United States v. Shaughnessy, 234 F.2d 715, 719 (2d Cir. 1955)
(discussing the effect of stare decisis in deciding subsequent cases).
213. Kevin Parks hypothesized a solution that is diametrically opposed to this theory: The complete abolition of the quality control doctrine. See supra notes 83-84 and
accompanying text (calling for the elimination of the quality control requirement).
214. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text (tracing the history of trademarks as providing the purchasing public with a means of redress against the manufac-
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ceptable, and courts may not promote it.215 All trademark owners
must be held to the same standard: Produce goods of consistent
quality or lose protection for their marks.216
Clearly defining the function of trademarks is a critical priority. Courts have thus far declared only that trademark holders have
the right to control the quality of the goods sold under their
marks,217 but that formulation of the law is not strong enough.
Trademark licensors should have an obligation to consumers to insure that their products are genuine.218 The quality of a good is
undisputedly an integral feature of the product.219 For example, a
Honda Civic that buyers would consider a “lemon” due to faulty
assembly obviously is not the same product as a Honda Civic that
operates properly. No consumer would consider such a dangerous
machine to be the genuine car he intended to purchase.220 That
buyer did not purchase the name; he bought the automobile because of the goodwill in the name.221
A broader application of the requirement would be consistent

turer of a certain product in the event those consumers purchase defective goods).
215. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text (illustrating a rule devised to
prevent the harm caused by consumer deception).
216. See supra note 206 and accompanying text (arguing that the fact that the quality control requirement, as applied by courts, treats trademark licensors differently than
trademark owners that do not license their marks is a flaw in the doctrine).
217. See El Greco Leather Prods. Co. v. Shoe World, Inc., 806 F.2d 392, 395 (“One
of the most valuable and important protections afforded by the Lanham Act is the right to
control the quality of the goods manufactured and sold under the holder’s trademark.”).
218. See Denison Mattress Factory v. Spring-Air Co., 308 F.2d 403, 409 (5th Cir.
1962) (holding that the licensor “had an affirmative duty to itself and to the public to invoke some kind of control and restraint upon its various licensees to prevent losing its
property rights thereunder”); Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart’s Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358,
367 (2d Cir. 1959) (“Clearly the only effective way to protect the public where a trademark is used by licensees is to place on the licensor the affirmative duty of policing in a
reasonable manner the activities of his licensees.”); 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 8, § 18:50
(“The licensor owes an affirmative duty to the public to assure that in the hands of his
licensee the trademark continues to represent that which it purports to represent.”).
219. See Shell Oil Co. v. Commercial Petroleum, Inc., 928 F.2d 104, 107 (4th Cir.
1991) (holding that the “quality control standards were an integral part of the . . . product
identified by the marks”).
220. See supra note 7 (defining the term “genuine” as applied to trademarked
goods).
221. See supra note 10 (stating that a brand name is inseparable from that brand’s
goodwil).
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with the public’s use of trademarks.222 Professor Schechter theorized that “the trademark is not merely a symbol of goodwill but
often the most effective agent for the creation of goodwill, imprinting upon the public’s mind an anonymous and impersonal guaranty
of satisfaction, creating a desire for further satisfactions.”223 A
court’s finding of abandonment, therefore, is proper whenever any
trademark owner allows the quality of its products to fluctuate.224
By allowing product quality to lapse, that owner reneges on its
guaranty of satisfaction.225
A problem with any trademark abandonment ruling is that the
brand’s goodwill remains in the market for anyone to exploit without fear of judicial interference, thereby opening the door to future
consumer deception.226 Although critics of a strong quality control
requirement argue that this mandates an alternate solution,227 the
fear of this sort of rampant consumer confusion is not realistic.
The same problem could arise in assignment in gross and naked licensing cases, where courts already apply the quality control
rule.228
There is no reason for the disparate treatment of licensing and
non-licensing trademark owners; a quality control violation carries
such a draconian punishment—loss of trademark protection—that
few trademark owners would risk violating the rule.229 The
stronger the brand, the greater the potential injury to a brand owner

222. See Weil Ceramics & Glass, Inc. v. Dash, 878 F.2d 659, 672 (3d Cir. 1989)
(analyzing the purposes of the Lanham Act, one of which is the protection of consumers
who purchase products based on their trademarks).
223. Schechter, supra note 4, at 819.
224. See supra notes 34-35 (explaining how a trademark owner’s failure to supervise the manufacturing process of a product can cause a court to rule that the trademark
owner has abandoned the brand under which he markets that particular product).
225. See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text (discussing how trademarks act
as guarantors of satisfaction).
226. See supra note 32 and accompanying text (setting forth the rules for trademark
abandonment under § 45 of the Lanham Act).
227. See, e.g., Parks, supra note 15, at 531-68 (arguing for the abolition of the quality control requirement).
228. See supra Parts I.C.1, I.C.2 (setting forth the rules against assignment in gross
and naked licensing).
229. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text (establishing the punishment for
quality control violations).
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upon a finding of abandonment. A trademark holder who cares
about his business will be certain to meet the quality control requirement once courts apply it to all owners.230 The risk of massive amounts of unprotected goodwill floating in the marketplace
is, therefore, de minimis.
CONCLUSION
The trademark system is based on trust between the public and
trademark holders. A mark gains goodwill as that trust develops
through consumers’ repeat-buying of genuine items produced and
distributed under the quality control of the brand owner. Consumers are deceived when a non-genuine good appears in the market
under a brand name. Shoppers become frustrated. Some even suffer serious injuries from products that were expected to work properly but turned out to have dangerous defects. If consumers repeatedly receive non-genuine goods, they will lose faith in the
system, and the entire trademark system will crumble because it
will no longer reduce consumer search costs.
Based on this analysis, courts must continue to protect and
strengthen the quality control requirement by applying it to all
trademark owners, regardless of whether or not they assign or license their marks to third parties. The courts must employ the
quality control requirement as a tool to punish trademark owners
who injure the public by allowing the quality of their goods to
fluctuate. Absent such judicial action, the trademark system will
fail to serve one of its purposes, namely, reducing consumer search
costs by using brands to represent consistent levels of product
quality.

230. See id.

